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Abstract
This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scan-
dal of 2006-2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional
investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell
volumes) in anticipation of rm-specic backdating exposures. Consistent with informed
trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term prots. More-
over, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely
a more severe issue and manifest earlier ahead of rm-specic exposures as the scope of the
scandal broadens. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances
earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading prots than non-local institu-
tions. Although we nd some evidence of over-reaction following the arrival of information
about the backdating scandal, these patterns are short-lived and exclusively due to the
activity of non-local institutions. Overall, institutions, particularly local ones, behave as
informed investors during this prolonged period of heightened uncertainty about corporate
reporting and governance practices.
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1 Introduction
Institutional investors managing large portfolios tend to be viewed as more sophisticated and
better informed than individual investors. As such, their trading activities may play a crucial
role in the impounding of information in market prices (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992;
Sias and Starks, 1997; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). Yet, systematic patterns in institutional
activity such as positive-feedback trading (De Long et al., 1990; Grin, Harris, and Topaloglu,
2003) and herding behavior (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch,
1992; Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Sias, 2004) may destabilize the price formation process and
hamper market eciency.
Reecting the conicting views regarding the information role of institutional investors, ex-
isting empirical studies also reach conicting conclusions about institutional investors' ability to
anticipate value-relevant corporate events. Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) docu-
ment that institutional investors anticipate earnings surprises and post-earnings announcement
drift using a decomposition of the TAQ data. In contrast, studies using proprietary trading
data nd no evidence that institutional investors as a group trade in the right direction prior
to major corporate announcements, e.g., large earnings surprises (Grin, Shu, and Topaloglu,
2012) or takeover announcements (Jegadeesh and Tang, 2010).1
In this paper, we use actual trades data from ANcerno to assess the role of institutional
investors during a wave of heightened uncertainty about the governance and reporting quality of
hundreds of listed companies: the stock-option backdating scandal of 2006-2007. In this setting,
we aim to address the following research questions. Do institutional trading activities anticipate
rm-specic exposures of corporate misconduct? Does the role of institutional activities ahead
of such rm-specic news vary predictably across rms/institutions? Do institutions over-react
to the arrival of information about rms' likely and/or actual misconduct, thereby destabilizing
the price formation process?
1The two studies nd conicting results regarding whether some institutional investors are able to take
advantage of their connections with investment banks. Grin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) nds no evidence of
such advantage, while Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) documents signicant buying by institutional clients of target
advisors during the one month before takeovers.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior systematic analysis of the role of institu-
tional trading around exposures of corporate reporting and governance failures. We believe it
is important to ll this void for several reasons and, in this regard, the option backdating scan-
dal of 2006-2007 provides a unique setting to do so. First, exposures of backdating practices
are associated with large (negative) abnormal changes in market valuations, -9% on average
(e.g., Bernile and Jarrell, 2009), allowing for sharper identication of the role of institutional
investors' activities in the price formation process. Second, it is important to note that back-
dating events are exogenous to rm operations, which reduce concerns that the corresponding
institutional activity may reect information about rm performance. Moreover, information
about backdating practices is unlikely to be disseminated privately by insiders, unlike other
events that have been explored in the literature, such as the merger and acquisition events
examined in Grin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) and Jegadeesh and Tang (2010). Therefore,
evidence of anticipatory trades by institutions ahead of rm-specic exposures is more likely to
reect the institutions' superior ability to process publicly available information, rather than
their access to private information.
Lastly, while corporate scandals are not typically systematic events, their determinants
may be correlated across rms, resulting in waves of correlated exposures (Gleason et al., 2008;
Carow et al., 2009). The backdating events were unexpected at rst and received massive media
exposure, with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ, henceforth) leading the way with its rst front-
page story, `The Perfect Payday', on March 18, 2006.2 The subsequent series of rm-specic
exposures evolved over a prolonged period and ultimately involved scores of companies. These
features allow us to examine whether and how anticipatory trades of institutional investors
ahead of rm-specic exposures vary as events unfolded in the public domain, e.g., the WSJ
coverage.
2Academic studies on stock price patterns around CEO stock option grants by Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie
(2007) provided the basis for the Pulitzer Prize{winning series of investigative articles by the WSJ in 2006. In
their followup paper, Heron and Lie (2009) estimated that as many as 23% of option grants had more favorable
return patterns (i.e., low return prior to the grant and high return subsequent to it) than randomly selected
grants in the years leading up to Sarbanes-Oxley, consistent with backdating of grants. In a 2006 study by
the Center for Financial Research and Analysis (CFRA), 17% of sample rms had, on three or more occasions,
option grant dates that were at or near 40-day stock price lows and were immediately followed by a signicant
stock increase.
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Our empirical tests and main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, we nd that
institutional abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell) are signicantly negative during
the trading month prior to the rst rm-specic news of potential option backdating problems.
This evidence is consistent with institutional traders anticipating information about the neg-
ative eects of rm-specic backdating exposures.3 Supporting this interpretation, negative
pre-exposure trading imbalances are larger in magnitude and more persistent for rms with
more severe governance and reporting failures, i.e., rms subjected to Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)/Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations or shareholder lawsuits. Fur-
ther supporting an active information gathering and processing role, negative pre-exposure
trading imbalances manifest earlier in event time as investors' awareness of the broad issue
increases, i.e., for Late rms whose alleged backdating practices are exposed more than six
months after the WSJ's rst article on option backdating in March 2006.
Second, we examine the short- and long-term protability of institutional trades to assess
their information content. Institutional trades in the month leading up to rm-specic media
exposures are protable, on average, both over short - i.e., when hypothetically reversed two
days - and long horizons - i.e., when hypothetically reversed three months - after a rm's
exposure. Thus, the direction of institutional trades predicts future price changes consistent
with informed trading, while the absence of prot reversal at the longer horizon suggests that
institutional trading activity does not destabilize the price formation process. Furthermore,
consistent with institutions actively assessing backdating risk and anticipating the evolution
of the scandal, their pre-exposure trades on Late rms are protable earlier in event time and
signicantly more protable than similarly timed trades on Early rms, i.e., whose alleged
backdating practices are exposed within six months of the WSJ article.
Third, we examine institutional trading activities and prots conditional on the investors'
likely informational advantage. To this end, we classify institutions in two groups for each
3Bernile and Jarrell (2009) nd that aggregate institutional ownership of backdating rms decreases by the
quarter-end following the rst rm-specic news. However, the 13-F quarterly holdings data that they use do not
allow for an examination of whether institutional investors anticipate rm-specic news or react to their public
arrival. The actual trade data allows us to examine whether institutional investors can anticipate rm-specic
exposures.
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stock in our sample: Local, i.e., those located in the same state as the rm's headquarters, and
Non-Local.4
Consistent with the notion that rm-investor proximity is associated with more informed
trading (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Baik, Kang, and Kim, 2010), we nd that local in-
vestors manifest negative pre-exposure trading imbalances earlier in event time, particularly for
Late stocks. Moreover, pre-exposure local trades consistently earn higher prots than similarly
timed non-local ones. This evidence implies that local institutional activities are both more
informed and timely than the trading activities of non-local institutions and, thus, less likely
to hamper market eciency.
Overall, the patterns in pre-exposure aggregate institutional activities, especially of local
investors, are consistent with informed trading. Next, in the spirit of Vega (2006), we analyze
the role of institutional trading following the arrival of public information. Specically, rst,
we test whether backdating exposures spill over onto institutional trades on \high-backdating-
risk" stocks that are never implicated in the scandal (Carow et al, 2009). Independent of
rms' actual involvement in the scandal, institutional abnormal trading imbalances on high-
risk stocks become signicantly negative as the frequency of rms exposed to have engaged
in option backdating practices doubles in June-August 2006 compared to March-May 2006.
This phenomenon, however, is fairly short-lived: while high-risk stocks that are ultimately
implicated continue to experience negative imbalances during the following six months, Sept.
2006-Feb. 2007, non-implicated high-risk stocks experience no abnormal imbalance over the
same period. Moreover, non-local investors alone account for any negative spillover and earn
negative abnormal prots on the corresponding trades, in line with the earlier conclusion that
the role of institutional trading depends on the investors' likely informational advantage.
In our last battery of tests, we examine whether institutional trading acts as a destabi-
4It is not obvious ex-ante that local investors should do better in this setting. While earlier studies of local
performance of institutional investors that use holding snapshots (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Baik, Kang, and
Kim, 2010) suggest that institutional investors possess some local advantage, studies examining more recent
data nd no evidence of this advantage in recent years, including during our sample period. For example,
Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2011) report that investors do not earn superior returns on local holdings after
the adoption of regulatory changes in early 2000s. Moreover, they also report that the excess holdings of local
domestic stocks by U.S. institutional investors decline signicantly following those regulatory reforms, beyond
the secular declining pattern of local bias over time.
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lizing force after the rst arrival of rm-specic backdating news for stocks actually caught
in the scandal. We nd that institutional investors continue to display negative trading im-
balances and their continued reaction is most pronounced when exposures are likely followed
by more severe consequences, i.e., rms subjected to SEC/DOJ investigations or shareholder
lawsuits. However, complementing our earlier inference, non-local institutions alone account
for the continued negative post-exposure imbalances and, consistent with over-reaction, earn
negative abnormal prots on the corresponding trades.
Our study provides several contributions to the literature. First, we add to the existing
literature on the role and dynamics of institutional trading by providing the rst analysis of
actual institutional trades during a wave of corporate scandals. It is not obvious a priori whether
the stylized facts from existing studies of other corporate events would be applicable in a setting
like ours, given its non-recurring, largely unexpected nature, and the high uncertainty associated
with its consequences. Indeed, our evidence that institutional traders as a group, particularly
local ones, are able to anticipate the evolution of the backdating scandal of 2006-2007 is in
contrast with the lack of such anticipatory role in other contexts documented by Grin, Shu,
and Topaloglu (2012) and Jegadeesh and Tang (2010) using datasets similar/identical to ours.
Moreover, our setting allows us to examine the anticipatory trades of institutional investors
in an information wave following a public event (i.e., WSJ coverage). This analysis is akin to
examining the anticipatory trades of institutions around the start of other information waves,
e.g., merger waves, which to the best of our knowledge has not been explored in the literature.
Second, our analysis adds to the arguably scant evidence on institutional trading around
exposures of corporate misconduct. Theory suggests that institutional trading around gover-
nance failures reects shareholders' optimal ex post incentives to punish management (Edmans
and Manso, 2011). Consistent with this logic, a survey of institutional investors by McCahery,
Sautner, and Starks (2010) indicates that 80% of respondents would `vote with their feet', i.e.,
trade, to make their voices heard on governance matters.5 While Karpo and Lou (2009) nd
5The idea that institutional investors may have an important direct governance role is long-standing (see,
e.g., reviews by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 2007). However, reviews by Karpo (2001) and
Gillan and Starks (2007) suggest that institutional activism may have little real eects on the targeted rms
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that short-sellers do in fact identify and trade stocks of rms engaged in nancial misreporting,
it is not obvious that long-only institutions in our sample would have the same ability and/or
incentives. Instead, institutions may have exerted their ex-post governance role predominantly
by ling the large number of class-action and derivative lawsuits that targeted backdating rms.
We provide direct evidence that institutional shareholders indeed exercise the threat of voting
with their feet around perceived governance failures.
Lastly, intense media coverage of corporate scandals may contribute to unwarranted re-
actions by less informed investors. Joe, Louis, and Robinson (2009) nd that, following the
BusinessWeek 's (BW ) publication of corporate boards' (in)eectiveness ratings, retail investors
react to the negative information and fail to anticipate subsequent corrective actions, while in-
stitutions act as contrarian traders and provide liquidity for individuals' excessive selling. Their
nding, however, is hard to generalize because the BW 's ratings rely on surveys of institutional
investors and, thus, convey a (much) weaker signal about the rms' governance quality to these
investors. We nd a consistent and more easily generalizable evidence that trading by less
informed (i.e., non-local) institutions following media exposures of governance failures may fuel
inecient contagion and over-reaction.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature and testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample and data used in our analysis.
Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses Development
In this section we develop testable hypotheses related to the role of institutional investors
during the backdating scandal of 2006-2007 in the backdrop of some discussion on the existing
literature and the evolution of the scandal.
Stock-option backdating refers to the practice of selecting favorable after the fact dates to
(e.g., Karpo, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996). More recent studies, instead, highlight the indirect governance
role that institutional investors may exert via the threat of ex post litigation (Cheng et al., 2009) or trading
(e.g., Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang, 2012; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007).
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ctitiously grant and report at-the-money stock option awards. Although it is estimated that
as many as 29% of options grants were backdated in the years leading up to Sarbanes-Oxley
(Heron and Lie, 2007), the practice was virtually unknown to the investing public prior to the
WSJ's Pulitzer Prize-winning `The Perfect Payday' article on March 18, 2006.6 As Figure 1
shows, from that point on, the \backdating scandal" captured the attention of news media
at least through the rst quarter of 2007. Based on various sources we use to construct our
sample - see next section, the number of companies publicly alleged to have engaged in option
backdating grew from 13 (end of March 2006) to 89 (end of August 2006), to 168 (end of 2006),
and nally tapered o reaching 198 (in June 2007). Over this period, the WSJ published tens
of rst-page stories on this issue and the business news media at large followed suit with a peak
of 566 separate reports only in October 2006, reaching a grand total of 7,272 between January
2006 and December 2008. The initial surge in the number of companies publicly caught in the
scandal was accompanied by increased attention of government agencies such as SEC, IRS, and
DOJ. As shown in Figure 2, public records indicate that SEC ocials started focusing publicly
on the backdating issue in June 2006, with a peak in September 2006 and continued attention
until mid-2007.
The existing evidence indicates that the media' and regulators' increased focus on backdating
is associated with large, negative abnormal stock returns for rms caught in the scandal - around
 9% on average (Narayanan et al., 2007; Bernile and Jarrell, 2009). No systematic evidence
exists, however, that allows to draw inferences about the segments of the market that drove the
documented patterns, nor about the role that dierent investors may have played with respect
to the price formation process around these events. Using 13-F quarterly holdings data, Bernile
and Jarrell (2009) nd that aggregate institutional ownership of backdating rms decreases by
6Bizjak et al. (2009) and Heron and Lie (2007) nd the rst mention of option backdating is in a Bualo
News' lone article identifying the CEO and other executives of Natural Fuel Gas of backdating stock options.
This article was published on March 18, 2001, incidentally exactly ve years before the WSJ' one. After that,
the SEC had announced investigations into option timing in 2004, but did not explicitly mention backdating.
In 2004, an academic working paper by Erik Lie - later published in 2005 - was the rst to suggest backdating
as a viable explanation for the systematically favorable price patterns enjoyed by executives around their option
grants' dates. Although a handful of news stories had mentioned the SEC investigation of backdating at Mercury
Interactive starting in November 2005, it is fair to say that backdating became a widely known phenomenon as
a result of and only after the WSJ article that brought it into the limelight in March 2006.
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the quarter-end following the rst rm-specic news. However, they do not attempt to identify
whether institutional investors anticipate rm-specic news or react to their public arrival.
The availability of actual trade data allows us to examine whether institutional investors can
anticipate these news exposures.
Do institutional investors anticipate rm-specic backdating news?
Our rst hypothesis (H1 ) posits that, if institutional trading is informed, then the resulting
institutional imbalances, i.e., buy minus sell, should be abnormally low prior to rm-specic
rst exposures. This hypothesis is in contrast to recent studies that use similar/identical propri-
etary trade data to identify institutional activities and nd no evidence of institutional trades
anticipating corporate announcements. Using Nasdaq's transaction conrmation service data,
Grin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) analyze the role of institutional trading around rm-specic
information events, such as takeovers and earnings announcements. They nd that aggregate
institutional trading cannot predict subsequent arrival of information, inconsistent with supe-
rior ability to gather or access value-relevant non-public information.7 Moreover, Jegadeesh
and Tang (2010) nd no evidence of aggregate institutional trades anticipating takeover an-
nouncements using the same ANcerno dataset that we use.8;9
We also conjecture that the magnitude and timing of institutional trading should reect
both the nature of a rm's involvement in the scandal as well as the timing of its exposure.
Specically, if institutional investors have the ability to gather and trade on value relevant
information, then their pre-exposure abnormal trading imbalances should be lower for likely
7In contrast, the institutional trades following earnings announcements in their sample earn positive prots
and aggregate trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) predict subsequent long-term returns, consistent
with institutions enjoying a comparative advantage in collecting, processing, and trading on public information.
8Puckett and Yan (2011) nd that intra-quarter trading activities of institutional investors in the ANcerno
dataset are persistently protable, particularly among high information asymmetry stocks, consistent with the
notion that these institutions act as informed traders during `normal' times.
9Another common approach relies on algorithms that classify unidentied publicly available trading volumes.
For instance, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) develop an algorithm to identify daily institutional
volume from TAQ data and nd that institutional investors correctly anticipate both earnings surprises and
the post-earnings announcement drift, consistent with a superior ability to collect and process information
around recurring rm-specic events. In a similar vein, Boehmer and Kelley (2009) use NYSE's Consolidated
Audit Trail Data (CAUD) to infer daily institutional trading and conclude that trading by institutions plays a
signicant role in the improved informational eciency of prices associated with greater institutional ownership,
as previously suggested by Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Sias and Starks (1997).
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more severe backdating cases (H1a). Moreover, if institutional investors have the ability to
extrapolate information (i.e., learn) from the publicly available history of backdating exposures,
then their pre-exposure abnormal imbalances should be lower earlier in event time for stocks
caught later in the wave of backdating exposures (H1b).
Do institutional investor pre-exposure trading activities disrupt market price for-
mation?
To assess the role of institutional investors with respect to the price formation process during
the backdating scandal, we examine the abnormal protability of their scandal-related trades
at various horizons. If institutional trading activities are primarily information-driven and do
not disrupt the price formation process, then the risk-adjusted protability of the underlying
trades should be positive both over short and long horizons (H2 ).10
Moreover, similar to the logic above, we expect the protability of institutional pre-exposure
trades to depend on the likely severity of the backdating, as well as the timing of the rm-
specic exposure. In particular, if pre-exposure institutional trades are informed, their abnormal
protability should be higher for likely more severe backdating cases (H2a) and manifest earlier
in event time for stocks caught in the later wave of exposures (H2b).
Does the role of pre-exposure trading vary with likely access to information?
Conceptually, the role of institutional investors with respect to the price formation process
should depend on the investors' likely access to value-relevant information. Available evidence
indicates that institutions invest disproportionately in and enjoy superior performance on local
stocks (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Baik, Kang, and Kim, 2010). Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2009) show analytically that investor-rm proximity may in fact confer the
investor a permanent information advantage, even if all investors have potential access to the
same information.
10Alternative hypotheses are as follows. If institutional trades are information-driven but hamper eciency
by contributing to market prices' over-reaction, then abnormal trading prots may be non-negative in the
short-run, but should decrease over longer horizons. If they are information-driven but require immediacy of
execution (i.e., consume liquidity), then their abnormal trading prots may be negative in the short-run, but
should increase and be non-negative over longer horizons.
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In light of these arguments, we conjecture that the role of institutional trading during the
backdating scandal varies with investors' proximity to the rm (H3 ). Specically, local institu-
tions should experience negative pre-exposure imbalances earlier in event time than non-local
ones (H3a). Moreover, pre-exposure trades of local institutions should earn higher abnormal
prots than similarly timed non-local trades (H3b). Since their trades respond to more timely
and valuable information signals about subsequent backdating exposures, we expect that the
trading activities of local institutions would not disrupt the price formation process .
Do institutional investors over-react to the public ow of backdating news?
The previous conjectures (H1-H3 ) focus on the information content of institutional trades
ahead of rm-specic backdating exposures. However, previous studies document systematic
patterns in institutional activities (e.g., positive-feedback trading and herding) that may desta-
bilize market prices, particularly after the arrival of public information. Indeed, the wave of
backdating news seems to have been anticipated as the scandal mounted (Bernile and Jar-
rell, 2009) and its eects to have spilled over onto high backdating risk stocks never actually
implicated in the scandal (Carow et al., 2009).
To assess whether institutional trading has a destabilizing role during the scandal, we con-
duct two sets of tests. First, we test whether the eects of backdating news spill over onto
institutional trades on stocks at high risk of being caught in the scandal, independent of their
actual involvement. If such contagion occurs, then institutional trading imbalances on high risk
stocks never involved in the scandal would mimic imbalances on stocks actually exposed (H4 ).
Alternatively, institutions may learn from the evolution of the scandal and, thus, be better
able to identify likely backdaters as the wave of backdating exposures unfolds. In this case,
H4 should hold predominantly during the rst wave of backdating exposures, but not later on
(H4a). Moreover, given the logic above, we conjecture that trades of more informed, i.e., local,
investors are unlikely to fuel potentially inecient contagion (H4b). Finally, if institutional
activities on high risk stocks are informed, then the protability of institutional trades should
be higher for rms ultimately exposed (H4c) and more so for local trades (H4d).
Second, we test whether the rst arrival of rm-specic backdating news prompts continued
10
(over-)reaction by institutional investors (H5 ). We conjecture that protracted post-exposure
negative imbalances would be more prevalent when rm-specic exposures are more salient. In
particular, we expect post-event imbalances to be larger when rm-specic exposures are likely
followed by more severe consequences (H5a) and occur early in the wave of the backdating
scandal (H5b). Moreover, following the logic above, we conjecture that the trading activities
of less informed, i.e., non-local, institutions are more likely to fuel over-reaction to rm-specic
backdating exposures (H5c), whereas post-exposure local trades should continue to be more
protable at short and long horizons (H5d).
3 Sample, Data, and Pre-scandal Characteristics
3.1 Sample and Data Sources
We obtain the sample of allegedly backdating rms from three separate sources: (1) the list
last updated by WSJ's \Options Backdating Scorecard" website on September 4, 2007; (2) the
\Yellow Card Trend Alert: Stock-Option Backdating Scandal" report last updated by Glass
Lewis & Co (2007) on March 16, 2007; and (3) the list last provided by Dow Jones News Service
on September 6, 2007.11 This initial sample includes 279 unique rms.
To be included in the nal sample, the rm must have: (i) at least one rm-specic back-
dating news story from an English-language news-source available on Factiva between January
1, 2006 to December 31, 2007; (ii) been traded at least once by ANcerno's institutions dur-
ing calendar year 2005; and (iii) price and return data in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database.12 Imposing these restrictions yields a nal sample of 198 rms ex-
plicitly identied in public news stories as having potentially engaged in stock option grant
backdating.
Complementing this set, there are 6,806 rms in the ANcerno's set that are never associated
11The WSJ's list is available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-
full.html; the GL's list is available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/glasslewis.pdf; -
nally, the DJNS's list is available on Factiva.
12ANcerno is a consulting rm that assists institutional investor clients (which include pension plan sponsors
such as CalPERS and money managers such as Putman Investments) in monitoring their equity trading costs.
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with the option backdating scandal. To conduct some of our tests, we estimate the likelihood
that a rm is publicly identied as having engaged in option backdating practices conditional
on ex-ante observable rm characteristics found to be signicant determinants in earlier studies
(e.g., Heron and Lie, 2009; Bizjak et al., 2009; Carow et al., 2009). The data requirements for
this part of the analysis reduce the sample to 3,133 unique rms, 157 of which are associated
with rm-specic backdating news between January 2006 and December 2007.
To identify the eective date on which a rm is caught in the scandal, following Bernile and
Jarrell (2009), we use the rst date on which any of the following news events becomes public:
(1) Internal Review; (2) SEC Investigation; (3) DOJ Investigation; (4) Expect Restatement;
(5) Delisting; (6) Lawsuit; (7) Executive or Director Departure; (8) Quantied Restatement;
(9) SEC Exoneration; (10) DOJ Exoneration.
Our tests rely on institutional trading data provided by ANcerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel
Noser Corporation).13 One important feature of the ANcerno's dataset is that it provides date-
stamped signed trade (i.e., buy/sell) volumes for all executed trades, eliminating the need to
rely on algorithms a la Lee and Ready (1991) to infer a trade's direction.14 Equally important is
the fact that execution prices and commissions of all trades are included in the dataset, allowing
a precise estimation of trading prots. We use ANcerno's data to construct the variables at
the heart of our analysis: (a) total, buy, and sell trading volumes scaled by shares outstanding,
and the resulting trading imbalances (i.e., scaled buy minus sell volume) for each stock-day;
and (b) raw and abnormal prots for each trade.
We rely on standard data sources to construct predictors of the likelihood that a rm is
publicly caught in the backdating scandal. In particular, using data from the last nancial
statements led prior to January 2006 and available on Compustat, we measure equity market
13ANcerno is a widely recognized consulting rm that monitors equity trading costs of institutional investors
such as CalPERS, Putman Investments, and Lazard Asset Management. Puckett and Yan (2011) provide a
thorough and detailed description of this dataset, recently used in several leading academic publications on
institutional trading. For sake of brevity, we refer the reader to their study for details about ANcerno data.
14The availability of actual trade data is particularly desirable in light of the evidence in Boehmer and Kelley
(2009) and Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009). Boehmer and Kelley show that actual intra-quarter
trading activities based on the NYSE's Consolidated Audit Trail Data are virtually uncorrelated with changes in
13-F institutions' holdings across consecutive quarters from 2000 to 2004. Similarly, Campbell et al. show that
trading inferred from simple trade-size cuto rules cannot explain quarterly changes in institutional holdings.
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capitalization, book leverage, whether the rm pays any dividends, and the value of outstand-
ing stock options. We use CRSP daily price data with ANcerno's transaction data to compute
trading prots, and separately to measure the daily volatility of rms' stock returns and the
length of time rms have been listed on a major exchange (i.e., age). We obtain daily returns
of the Fama-French 5x5 size and book-to-market matching portfolios from Ken French's web-
site.15 Finally, we retrieve analyst coverage data from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) and 13(f) holdings from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database. For the
sake of brevity, we remand to Appendix Table A.1 for further details about the variables.
Some of our tests are based on the rm-investor proximity. For the purpose of this analysis,
we collect from 13F lings the locations of portfolio managers in the ANcerno set. We then
categorize the investor's trades as Local, when the rm headquarters is located in the same state
as the investor, and Non-Local, otherwise. The majority of portfolio managers in ANcerno are
U.S.-based and we are able to match the location of nearly 80 percent of their trades.
3.2 Pre-scandal Trading Activities and Firm Characteristics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables in our analysis measured during or as of the
end of 2005, after we partition the sample into Backdating and Non-Backdating Firms. For each
group, panel A reports the summary statistics of the daily trading activities in the ANcerno
dataset measured during 2005; Panel B reports similar statistics for rm-level characteristics
that we use as predictors of the likelihood that public news stories may associate a rm with
the option backdating scandal.
Panel A indicates that, during 2005, the mean (median) rm-level daily trading activity -
i.e., scaled total, buy, or sell volumes - of ANcerno institutions is more than twice (four times)
for backdating rms than non-backdating rms. In both samples, however, the typical daily
institutional trading imbalance is marginally positive and one cannot reject the hypothesis of no
dierences in net daily trade volumes across the two samples. In subsequent analysis, we adopt
the 2005's rm-level time-series means of institutional trading measures as our benchmarks to
15At http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ftp/25 Portfolios 5x5 Daily.zip
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test whether institutional trading activities change signicantly during the backdating scandal.
The cross-sectional sample statistics in Panel B show that, prior to the scandal, backdating
and non-backdating rms are signicantly dierent along various dimensions, also in line with
the heavier institutional trading activities for the former group. Indeed, at the end of 2005,
both mean and median total institutional holdings of rms caught in the scandal are larger,
whether we include all institutions or only institutional blockholders, i.e., those holding at least
a 5% stake. These rms are also larger and older, more heavily followed by analysts, more
likely to be part of the S&P500 index, and less likely to pay dividends.16 Moreover, although
backdating rms rely less on nancial leverage, on average, they also have more volatile equity
returns. This is due to the operating characteristics of rms caught in the scandal, which are
more likely to be from high-tech industries as dened by Heron and Lie (2009), 22% versus less
than 9% for non-backdating rms. Finally, perhaps unsurprisingly, the mean (median) value of
outstanding stock options as a fraction of common equity capitalization is signicantly higher,
almost 50%, in the backdating sample prior to the scandal.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss the empirical methods used to test our hypotheses and the resulting
evidence. Subsection 4.1 presents the empirical evidence regarding the role of institutional
trading in anticipation of rm-specic backdating exposures (H1-H3 ). In Subsections 4.2 and
4.3, we discuss the evidence concerning the spill over of backdating news onto institutional
trades on high risk stocks never implicated in the scandal (H4 ) and the role of institutional
trading in reaction to the rst arrival of rm-specic backdating news (H5 ), respectively.
16These characteristics are consistent with stylized facts on the determinants of institutional ownership - see,
for instance, recent evidence in Yan and Zhang, 2009).
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4.1 Role of Institutional Trading Prior to Backdating Exposures
4.1.1 Institutional Trading Imbalances Prior to Backdating Exposures
We begin our analysis using an event study approach to test whether institutional investors
display abnormal trading activities in anticipation of rm-specic backdating exposures. To this
end, for each rm in the backdating sample, we separately aggregate daily institutional buy and
sell volumes and compute the resulting trading imbalances, all scaled by shares outstanding,
for each trading day in the relevant rm-specic event-window. Then, for each daily trading
measure, we compute mean abnormal institutional daily trading activity as:
AV OL =
NP
i=1
1
N
k+TP
t=k
1
T
(V OLit  Benchmarki) (1)
where V OLit is the trading volume measure (i.e., scaled aggregate buy, sell, or buy minus
sell volume) of stock i on event day t, with t = 0 on the rst rm-specic backdating news'
date as previously dened; Benchmarki is the time-series mean of stock i's daily institutional
trading metric during calendar year 2005; N is the number of sample rms and T is the number
of trading days contained in the relevant event-window, [k; k + T ].
Table 2 reports the mean abnormal daily institutional trading prior to rm-specic back-
dating exposures for various pre-exposure windows and subsamples. To assess H1, Panel A
reports mean daily scaled volumes for the whole sample of rms having at least one identi-
able backdating-related news story. Mean daily abnormal buy volumes are negative across all
pre-exposure windows and signicant at conventional levels starting in the [ 60; 21] window.
The pattern for abnormal sell volumes is more erratic. On average, institutional sell volumes
are abnormally low around the same time when abnormal buy volumes too become signicantly
negative - i.e., [ 60; 21] window - suggesting a broader reduction in overall institutional trad-
ing activities. On the day of the exposure, institutional abnormal sell volumes are positive
and signicant, both statistically and economically. Specically, the evidence indicates that
daily sell volumes nearly double on the exposure day compared to the typical 2005 daily level
- approximately 0.075%, see Table 1.
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Following prior studies, our tests focus on the resulting trading imbalances as a measure of
investor trading activities around backdating exposures. Abnormal buy minus sell volumes are
consistently negative prior to rm-specic exposures and mostly statistically and economically
signicant. Indeed, our sample institutions accumulate 1% less of the exposed rms' outstanding
shares than they would have in the benchmark period (i.e., 0.71%=0.0059%*121), resulting in
a net reduction of their holdings of backdating rms. The evidence, thus, rejects the null
hypothesis of no abnormal trading and supports the notion that institutional trading prior to
backdating exposures reects information about their negative wealth eects.
In untabulated tests, we conduct a robustness analysis to control for potential market-wide
and/or rm-related news that takes place in the same window. To control for rm-related news,
we obtain a matching sample of rms with similar trading pattern in the benchmark period
and yet do not have a high probability of experiencing rm-specic backdating events. In
particular, for each rm experiencing backdating news, we nd a matching non-event rm that
satises the following criteria: (1) is in the lowest quintile of ex-ante probability of experiencing
a backdating event17, and (2) has the highest correlation with the backdating rm in terms
of residual buy-sell imbalance in the benchmark period18. We then examine the matching
rms in the same window as the backdating rms to control for potential market-wide trading
imbalance. Supporting our base inference, we observe no signicant imbalance for the matching
rms during the pre-event window, consistent with H1.19
In Panel B of Table 2, we test whether institutional trading imbalances are more negative
when rms' backdating exposures are likely to reveal more severe governance and reporting
issues (H1a). To conduct this test, we segment the sample rms based on the amount of
scrutiny that outsiders exert on the rm following its exposure and the result of such scrutiny.
17We describe the probability model in more details in the next section.
18We follow the analysis in Kumar and Lee (2006) and regress daily BSI of each stock on daily excess
market return to obtain residual buy-sell imbalance that is orthogonal to the market factor. We then examine
the correlation of each potential matching rm with the sample rms and choose the rm with the highest
correlation. The median correlation of the residual BSI in the benchmarking period between the event sample
and the matching sample is 0.87.
19The results of this untabulated analysis are available upon request. The results in Figure 3 and Panel C
of Table 6, and the associated discussion in section 4.2.1 provide additional evidence that our results are not
driven by market-wide trends in trading imbalances.
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In particular, SECDOJ or Lawsuit contains 137 rms subject of SEC or DOJ investigations
without subsequent exoneration or of shareholder class-action/derivative lawsuits, whereas the
No sample includes 29 rms receiving SEC or DOJ exoneration notice or facing no shareholder
lawsuit and conducting no internal investigation and not subject of SEC or DOJ investigation.
The evidence shows that rms likely to suer more severe consequences following backdating
exposures experience signicantly negative daily abnormal trading imbalances starting three
weeks prior to the rst rm-specic news. By contrast, rms that news media generically
associate with backdating during the scandal period experience trading imbalances that are not
signicantly dierent from their 2005 levels throughout the pre-event windows. The statistically
and economically signicant dierences across the two samples support H1a and suggest that
institutional trading imbalances in anticipation of rm-specic exposures reect information
about the likely severity of the underlying misconduct and its consequences.
In Panel C of Table 2, we test whether the (event-) timing of institutional trading imbalances
prior to backdating exposures depends on the timing of the rst rm-specic news relative to the
overall evolution of the scandal (H1b). To test this hypothesis, we segment the rst rm-specic
exposures in two groups by calendar time: Early Exposure for events on or before August 31,
2006 vs Late Exposure for events afterwards. We choose this date because it corresponds to
roughly six months after the WSJ's article that prompted the public scrutiny on option granting
practices and, thus, our earliest pre-event window. If institutions learn from the evolution of
the scandal, their trading imbalances should anticipate rm-specic exposures earlier in event
time for the later wave of exposures (H1b).
The evidence in Panel C supports this hypothesis. First, Late Exposure rms experience
statistically signicant negative abnormal imbalances earlier in event time than Early Exposure
ones. Late Exposure rms experience signicant cumulative abnormal imbalances of -0.5%
(-.0081%*60) in the window [ 120; 61], representing over 65% of this group's cumulative
abnormal imbalance over the entire [ 120; 0] window. Although not statistically signicant,
Early Exposure rms in fact experience positive abnormal imbalances over the same pre-event
window - which for most of these rms spans periods prior to the WSJ's March 2006 article.
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Starting in the window [ 60; 21], institutional abnormal imbalances of Early Exposure rms
tend to be signicantly larger in magnitude than those of Late Exposure ones, and increasingly
so as the rm exposure date approaches.
4.1.2 Protability of Institutional Trades Prior to Backdating Exposures
To assess the role of institutional trading with respect to the price formation process (H2 ), we
examine the protability of pre-exposure institutional trades at various post-exposure horizons.
Specically, we assume all pre-exposure trades are reversed at the close of 1 or 60 trading
days after the corresponding rm-specic exposures, t = 0.20 We estimate institutional trades'
abnormal prots as follows. First, for each transaction in the database, we compute its raw
percentage prot as:
Profiti;k;t = I  100  (Pricet   TransactionPricek)
TransactionPricek
(2)
where I is an indicator variable equal to 1 for buys and -1 for sells; Pricet is the closing price
of the stock as recorded in CRSP on trading day t after the transaction date k, adjusted for
stock splits and dividends since k; and TransactionPricek is the price at which the transaction
is executed on date k as recorded in the ANcerno database. Then, to estimate the transaction
abnormal prot, we subtract from (2) the product of I and the buy-and-hold return on the
Fama-French size and book-to-market matched portfolio over the same [k; t] window.
Panel A of Table 3 reports transaction value-weighted mean abnormal (%) prots of institu-
tional trades executed over various pre-exposure trading windows. The mean dollar transacted
in the trading month prior to rm-specic backdating exposures earns a statistically signif-
icant positive abnormal return, which increases with the liquidation horizon from 0.72% to
1.64% (when the positions are reversed 60 trading days after the event). Thus, supporting H2,
the evidence indicates that institutional trades in the month preceding rm-specic exposures
are consistent with information-driven activity. When we extend the trading window back in
event-time, the evidence becomes more erratic and arguably harder to interpret in light of the
20In unreported analysis, we use 20 trading days and obtain consistent results.
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evolution of the backdating scandal. Nonetheless, a systematic pattern emerges when compar-
ing prots across trading windows: institutional trades executed closer to the exposure events
are more protable, consistent with more informed trading.
To gain further insights on the role of institutional trading activities, similar to earlier tests,
we segment backdating exposures based on their likely severity or on their timing relative to
the evolution of the scandal. Panel B of Table 3 reports mean abnormal prots of institutional
pre-exposure trades on stocks in the SECDOJ or Lawsuit and No subsamples. Consistent with
informed trading, on average, pre-event trades in the month leading to rst rm-specic back-
dating news earn positive and signicant abnormal prots both at short and long liquidation
horizons in the subsample of more severe cases. In contrast, the mean abnormal prots are
signicantly negative in the other sample over the same trading window and liquidation hori-
zons. Consistent with H2a, the dierences across the two samples are statistically signicant
at conventional condence levels.
Panel C of Table 3 presents mean abnormal prots of institutional trades on stocks in
the Early Exposure and Late Exposure subsamples. We conjecture that trading prots should
vary with the timing of rms' exposures relative to the overall scandal, if the trades reect
institutions' learning and, thus, better timing as the scandal progressed. Consistent with the
evidence in Panel A, the protability of institutional trades in the month prior to exposure
events is positive for both groups of rms, regardless of the liquidation horizon. Yet, consistent
with learning, mean trade protability for Late Exposure stocks in the [ 20; 1] window is
signicantly higher than for Early Exposure ones. Moreover, complementing the inference based
on trading imbalances, institutional pre-exposure trades earn positive mean abnormal prots
earlier in event time for Late Exposure stocks, and the dierences in protability across the
two samples are signicant regardless of the trading window and liquidation horizon. Overall,
supporting H2b, the evidence indicates that pre-exposure institutional trading becomes more
protable as investors learn about the scope and severity of the backdating scandal.
The inference based on the baseline event-time analysis above may be aected by the clus-
tering of backdating exposures over the 2006-2007 period. To check for robustness, we perform
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a calendar-time portfolio analysis. We begin by creating a daily list of stocks that satisfy the
following requirement: the rm-specic rst backdating news event happens within the subse-
quent 20 trading days or on that day or on the previous day. Then, we generate a daily \buy"
portfolio consisting of all stocks on this daily list, with each stock's portfolio weight equal to the
total dollar buy volume on the stock on that day and the previous 20 trading days. Similarly,
we generate an equivalent daily \sell" portfolio, with weights based on total dollar sell volumes.
Finally, we calculate the daily return to the zero-cost hedge portfolio that is long the \buy"
portfolio and short the \sell" portfolio. Since all stock returns are aggregated each day into
one hedge portfolio return, the series of daily portfolio returns are not aected by changes in
market conditions and/or clustering of backdating news events.
Panel D of Table 3 reports the time-series mean of the hedge portfolio daily returns for the
whole sample, the SECDOJ or Lawsuit subsample, and the Late Exposure subsample. The main
inferences remain unaected: institutional trades executed in the month leading to backdating
exposures are protable, on average. Again, in the subsamples of more severe cases or late
exposures, pre-event trades are associated with more positive and signicant abnormal returns.
We also allow stocks to stay on the daily list if the rst rm-specic backdating news happens
during the previous 60 trading days, while still requiring trades to be executed in the [-20,-1]
event window. The results reported in the last column of Panel D show that our inferences
and the magnitudes of abnormal returns remain unchanged when we assume a longer holding
horizon.
In sum, the evidence in Table 3 is consistent with informed trading by institutional investors.
Moreover, we nd that the information content of pre-exposure institutional trades increases
with the severity of the subsequent rm-specic news or after investors have a chance to learn
about the scope of the broader scandal. Finally, we nd no systematic evidence that institu-
tional trading disrupts the price formation process prior to rm-specic backdating exposures.
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4.1.3 Does the Role of Institutional Investors Vary with Access to Information?
Eect of Geographic Location
In this subsection, we examine whether the role of institutional trading around backdating
exposures depends on the investors' likely informational advantage (H3 ). More precisely, we
conjecture that the information content of institutional trades should increase with rm-investor
geographical proximity (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Baik, Kang, and Kim,
2010). To conduct our tests, we classify trades in the ANcerno set into two groups for each stock:
local, i.e., trades of portfolio managers located in the same state as the rm's headquarters, and
non-local. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the evidence from these tests.
Table 4 reports mean abnormal daily trading imbalances of local and non-local institutions
over various pre-exposure windows. We perform the analysis for the whole sample of backdating
rms, Panel A, or separately for SECDOJ or Lawsuit or Late Exposure rms, Panels B and
C, respectively. Supporting H3a, Panel A shows that local investors experience signicantly
negative pre-exposure abnormal imbalances earlier in event time than non-local ones. Moreover,
in line with earlier evidence, we nd that the dierences in pre-exposure trading activities
across investors are particularly prominent for the Late Exposure subsample, Panel C. This
is consistent with the idea that local traders are better able to exploit information about the
broad evolution of the scandal to (privately) identify backdating rms yet to be tainted.
Table 5 reports transaction value-weighted mean abnormal (%) prots of local and non-
local trades executed over various pre-exposure windows. As before, we assume that trades are
reversed either: one trading day, Panel A, or 60 trading days, Panel B, after the rst rm-
specic backdating news. As in Table 4, we perform the analysis for the whole backdating
sample, and separately for SECDOJ or Lawsuit or Late Exposure rms only. Across trading
windows, liquidation horizons, and targeted stocks, we nd that local pre-exposures trades
earn positive mean abnormal prots that are signicantly higher than similarly timed non-
local trades. Supporting H3b, this evidence suggests that local investors enjoy an informational
advantage. The absence of reversal when the liquidation horizon is extended to 60 trading
days suggests that information-based local trades do not disrupt the price formation process.
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Furthermore, consistent with the tenet of H3, the excess protability of local trades is higher
when subsequent rm-specic backdating exposures are more salient, i.e., SECDOJ or Lawsuit
in Panels A2 and B2, or investors can exploit information about the broad evolution of the
scandal to (privately) identify backdating rms yet to be tainted, i.e., Late Exposure in Panel
A3 and B3.
4.2 Is there Backdating News Contagion across Institutional Trades?
The evidence to this point indicates that institutional trading activities anticipate value-relevant
information about subsequent rm-specic backdating exposures. This is especially true when
the underlying corporate misconduct is likely more salient or when public awareness of the
broader scandal is likely higher. The latter nding, in particular, suggests that institutions
exploit information about the evolution scandal to (attempt to) identify rms likely to have
engaged in backdating practices ahead of rm-specic news. In this section, we address a
question naturally related to these ndings: do backdating news spill over onto institutional
trades on stocks never associated with option backdating, consistent with over-reaction to
public information about the scope of the scandal?
To address this question, we begin by estimating a simple Probit model of the likelihood
that a rm is caught in the backdating scandal conditional on ex ante observable characteristics.
We take the lead from existing studies of backdating events to select a set of rm characteristics
shown to co-vary with the occurrence of rm-specic backdating news (Narayanan et al., 2007;
Bernile and Jarrell, 2009; Bizjak et al., 2009; Heron and Lie, 2009; Carow et al., 2009). In
particular, we focus on variables arguably easy-to-observe/retrieve for investors in our sample.
The model coecient estimates, marginal eects, and associated test statistics are reported in
Appendix Table A.2. Then, for each rm, we use the model estimates to predict the (ex-ante)
likelihood that the rm is publicly alleged to have engaged in backdating. Finally, we partition
sample rms into quintiles after ranking the predicted probabilities from low (Q1) to high (Q5).
While a detailed discussion of the model is beyond the scope of this paper, some observa-
22
tions are noteworthy.21 First, as previously noted, the sample size shrinks notably due to data
constraints. Second, several of the model coecient estimates are statistically signicant at
conventional levels. Third, some of the marginal eects are economically large compared to
the unconditional probability of backdating exposures, approximately 5%. Therefore, notwith-
standing its naivete - which we view as desirable, the model captures some of the systematic
variation in backdating exposure occurrences.
4.2.1 Institutional Trading Activities on High Backdating Risk Stocks
Our analysis in this section mostly focuses on rms in the high backdating risk (\high risk",
henceforth) quintile, Q5. Nonetheless, it is informative to compare abnormal institutional
trading imbalances across the extreme backdating likelihood quintiles (Q1 and Q5 ). Figure 3
plots mean daily abnormal trading imbalance dierentials between Q1 and Q5 for each month
between January 2006 and December 2007. The mean dierential, Q5-Q1, is negative (and
statistically signicant at least at the 10% level) in 18 (11) out of the 21 months that follow
the WSJ's `The Perfect Payday' article in Mar. 2006. By contrast, over the same period,
there is only one month (i.e., Feb. 2007) when the dierential is positive and signicant. These
dierences in institutional imbalances are in line with the idea that the wave of backdating news
aected institutional investors' trading strategies and dispel the notion that the imbalances
associated with backdating news simply reect market-wide trends.
In the remaining analysis, we investigate in greater detail the institutional trading activities
on high risk stocks, Q5. This analysis is conducted in calendar (trading) time, with t = 0 on
March 18, 2006, the day the WSJ began its investigative series on option backdating. Table 6
reports mean abnormal daily imbalances for all high risk stocks, Panel A, and separately for
high risk stocks actually, Q5-Already/Later, or never, Q5-Never, involved in the backdating
scandal, Panels B and C, respectively.
Panel A reports mean daily abnormal institutional trading imbalances over various trading
windows following the inception of the scandal for all high risk stocks, Q5. Consistent with
21We refer the reader to the papers cited in the main text for a thorough discussion of issues related to the
likelihood that rms engage in option backdating practices and are subsequently identied as having done so.
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Figure 3, high risk stocks experience negative mean abnormal imbalances starting in the three
months after the `The Perfect Payday' article and persisting for up to a year. The mean
imbalances, however, are economically large and statistically signicant only at the height of the
scandal, [61; 120], when the fraction of companies ultimately exposed went from approximately
20% to 60% and the scope of the scandal became more apparent - see also Figures 1, 2, and 3.
Panels B and C of Table 6 report mean abnormal imbalances separately by rms' ultimate
involvement in the scandal: those eventually caught in the scandal, Q5-Already/Later, and those
never publicly associated with option backdating practices, Q5 Never, respectively. For stocks
ultimately caught in the scandal, Q5-Already/Later, mean abnormal imbalances are negative
and signicant throughout the rst trading year. For the Q5-Never sample, instead, abnormal
imbalances are negative and signicant only at the height of the scandal - i.e., t 2 [61; 120].
Therefore, when the intensity of exposures is at its peak, we nd evidence consistent with
negative spillover across high risk stocks (H4 ). Past this period, any spillover eect seems to
subside, as institutional trading activities more accurately target high risk stocks ultimately
caught in the backdating scandal, consistent with H4a. Incidentally, the lack of evidence in
Panel C also conrms that the documented imbalances for backdating rms do not simply
reect market-wide trends.
In Table 6, we also examine separately the trading activities of local and non-local institu-
tional investors following the WSJ article. We nd that local institutions' abnormal imbalances
are negative and signicant only for Q5-Already/Later stocks, while non-local institutions' ab-
normal imbalances are negative and signicant for Q5-Never stocks during the rst six months
following the WSJ's `The Perfect Payday' article. Thus, supporting H4b and complement-
ing earlier results, the evidence suggests that trading of local institutions is unlikely to fuel
potentially inecient spillover eects onto non-implicated high risk stocks.
4.2.2 Protability of Institutional Trades on High Backdating Risk Stocks
In this section, we analyze the information content of institutional trades on high risk stocks
during the scandal. In line with earlier tests, we assess institutional trades' abnormal prots at
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short and long liquidation horizons to draw inferences about the potential impact of institutional
trading activities on the price formation process. Table 7 summarizes the results of this analysis
for all high risk stocks, Panel A, and separately for high risk stocks actually, Q5-Already/Later,
or never, Q5-Never, involved in the backdating scandal, Panels B and C, respectively.
In Panel A, we nd that, at the onset of the scandal, i.e., t 2 [1; 60], institutional trades'
abnormal prots on high risk stocks are positive and relatively large independent of the liquida-
tion horizon. During the next year or so, i.e., t 2 [61; 350], as the media coverage of the scandal
and the number of exposed rms increases, institutional trading prots remain positive at both
liquidation horizons, but are notably weaker. Overall, the results are consistent with informed
institutional trading for stocks at a high risk of being involved in the backdating scandal.
Although we observe similar patterns in the protability of institutional trades in the Q5-
Already/Later, Panel B, and Q5-Never partitions, Panel C, some dierences are noteworthy.
Consistent with H4c, across all trading windows, the mean abnormal prots of institutional
trades in the Q5-Already/Later sample are signicantly higher than for other high risk stocks
and the dierences are economically large. Most notably, in line with our earlier inference about
the spillover of backdating news at the peak of the scandal, i.e., [61; 120], we nd evidence of
marginally negative prots in the Q5-Never sample, while trades on Q5-Already/Later stocks
continue to be signicantly protable.
To gain further insights, in Table 7, we also segment the sample by investors' likely in-
formation advantage, i.e., local and non-local trades. The evidence suggests that local trades
have consistently higher information content than non-local ones across all trading windows,
and the dierences are statistically signicant and economically large. Consistent with H4d,
the dierences between local and non-local prots are larger for trades on high risk stocks
eventually caught in the scandal, Q5-Already/Later. Finally, to the extent that institutional
trading fuels inecient contagion of backdating news across high risk stocks, this seems limited
to trades executed at the peak, i.e., t 2 [61; 120], of the scandal (H4a) by the less informed,
i.e., non-local, institutions (H4b). Except for this segment of investors during the `backdating
frenzy', however, the evidence widely supports the notion that institutional trading activities
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on high risk stocks during the backdating scandal are informed and rational.
4.3 Post-Event Trading Activities and Protability
Institutional trading activities may hamper ecient market formation process if they fuel an
excessive reaction to the arrival of rm-specic news (H5 ). To assess this possibility, in this
section, we analyze institutional trading imbalances and prots after rm-specic backdating
exposures. We hypothesize that a continued institutional reaction to rm-specic exposures
should be larger when the exposures are more salient/severe (H5a), early in the evolution of
the backdating scandal (H5b), and among less informed, i.e., non-local, institutions (H5c). To
the extent that institutions fuel inecient over-reaction to rm-specic exposures, we expect
non-local ones to be the primary (or exclusive) driver of such destabilizing activity (H5d).
Table 8 reports mean abnormal daily trading imbalances following the rm-specic rst
exposures across all institutions, in Panel A. It also presents mean abnormal imbalances by the
likely salience of the backdating exposures, in Panel B, by their timing relative to the broader
scandal, in Panel C, and by rm-investor proximity, in Panel D. Consistent with the general
tenor of H5, there is evidence in Panel A of protracted abnormal institutional trading for up to
two weeks after the rst arrival of rm-specic backdating news, i.e., t 2 [1; 10]. Specically,
supporting H5a, we nd that the continued institutional reaction to rm-specic exposures is
statistically and economically larger when the exposure is likely more salient, Panel B. In fact,
consistent with the pre-exposure results and informed trading, we nd no evidence of abnormal
institutional trading activities for rms subsequently exonerated. Moreover, although only the
abnormal imbalances on Early Exposure stocks continue to be negative for up to two weeks in
line with H5b, the dierences in Panel C are not statistically signicant. Finally, the evidence
in Panel D suggests that only the activity of less informed, i.e., non-local, institutions fuels
protracted and potentially destabilizing reactions to rm-specic exposures (H5c).
To assess the potential impact of post-exposure institutional trades on the quality of mar-
ket prices, we examine their protability over the duration of the backdating scandal. Table 9,
whose structure is similar to Table 8, reports transaction value-weighted mean prots of trades
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executed during the 20 trading days after rm-specic exposures. In Panels A through C, we
nd that post-exposure institutional trades consistently earn negative abnormal prots when
liquidated at the longest horizon. This is consistent with the notion that post-exposure insti-
tutional trading has lower information content and may destabilize market prices by fostering
over-reaction to rm-specic backdating news.
However, consistent with H5d, the evidence in Panel D shows that the trades of less informed,
i.e., non-local, investors exclusively account for the aggregate negative abnormal prots. Thus,
in addition to our inference concerning H5c, it appears that protracted post-exposure activities
of non-local institutions can disrupt the price formation process following the arrival of rm-
specic backdating news. Conversely, post-exposure local trades continue to earn small, but
positive abnormal prots. Together with the results in Panel D of Table 8, this evidence sug-
gests that local institutional trading activities may facilitate the post-exposure price formation
process by partially absorbing excessive trading of less informed non-local investors.
5 Summary and Conclusions
There is an ongoing debate about the role of institutional investors in capital markets and, in
particular, whether they are informed and how their trading activities aect the price formation
process in the market. This paper presents the rst systematic analysis of institutional trading
patterns and performance around exposures of corporate governance and reporting failures, a
desirable testing ground given the large uncertainty surrounding these events.
Existing studies show that market participants view backdating exposures as negative in-
formation events. We document for the rst time that aggregate institutional imbalances (buys
minus sells) are abnormally negative in anticipation of rm-specic exposures, consistent with
informed trading. Moreover, the pre-exposure imbalances are larger in magnitude and more
persistent when subsequent exposures are more salient. Also, suggestive of `learning', pre-
exposure abnormal imbalances begin to manifest earlier ahead of rm-specic news for stocks
caught in the later wave of exposures.
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Consistent with informed trading that does not disrupt the price formation process, institu-
tional trades in the month leading up to rm-specic exposures are protable both at short and
long post-exposure horizons. The timeliness and information content of institutional trades,
however, vary with investors' likely information advantage. Indeed, more informed, i.e., local,
institutions display negative pre-exposure abnormal imbalances earlier and earn higher prots
than non-local institutions.
While institutional investors' anticipation of rm-specic news is consistent with informed
trading that may improve eciency, we also nd that institutional trading may disrupt the price
formation process in reaction to the arrival of backdating news. Namely, there is evidence that
institutional trades contribute to over-reaction to actual exposures and to unwarranted spillover
of backdating news onto unimplicated high risk stocks. Nonetheless, these short-lived patterns
are exclusively due to the trading activities of non-local institutions and partially absorbed by
more informed local institutions. Collectively, the evidence is largely consistent with informed
trading by institutional investors that does not disrupt the price formation process during the
wave of exposures of option backdating practices.
Our analysis of rm-specic exposures within the broader backdating \wave" also indicates
that, when analyzing institutional investors' role, it may be important to distinguish rm-
specic isolated events from rm-specic news that have implications for wider segments of the
market. If events of the latter type foreshadow unfolding waves of related news, institutional
investors could be better suited to identify and anticipate them - i.e., \ride the wave" - due to
a greater availability of expertise and resources. Then, the role of institutional investors would
depend crucially on the pervasiveness and broader implications of rm-specic events, and the
eects of their trades with respect to market eciency would extend beyond just those on the
stock experiencing a particular event. We believe this is an interesting line of inquiry that may
prove fruitful in future research.
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Appendix Table A.1 – Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Trading Volume Measures 
VolInst Daily institutional total (buy plus sell) volume as a percentage of the latest number of shares outstanding 
VolInstBuy Daily institutional buy volume as a percentage of shares outstanding  
VolInstSell Daily institutional sell volume as a percentage of shares outstanding 
VolInstImbal VolInstBuy minus VolInstSell; daily institutional trading volume imbalance as a percentage of shares outstanding 
Profit/Return Measures  
Trading Profit (%) 
For buys, 100*(CRSP Price [+t] - ANcerno Buy Price) / ANcerno Buy Price, adjusted 
for stock splits and dividend distributions;  
For sells, 100*(ANcerno Sell Price - CRSP Price [+t]) / ANcerno Sell Price, adjusted 
for stock splits and dividend distributions 
Abnormal Trading Profit (%) 
Trading profit in excess of buy-and-hold return of Fama-French matching 5x5 
portfolio based on market value of equity and ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity as of December 2005 
Daily Calendar-Time  
Buy-Sell Portfolio Return (%) 
The average daily return of principal-weighted daily portfolio of all buy trades in 
the [-20,-1] event window on stocks for which the first firm-specific backdating 
news event happens within the subsequent 20 trading days or on that day or on the 
previous day, minus the average daily return of the corresponding principal-
weighted daily portfolio of all sell trades in the same window on the same stocks. 
Firm Characteristics 
BackdateDum Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is public release of firm-specific backdating news, and zero otherwise 
Benchmark Meani  
Calendar year 2005 time-series mean of stock i’s daily institutional trading activity 
as a percentage of shares outstanding (ANcerno) 
Benchmark Stdi 
Calendar year 2005 time-series standard deviation of stock i’s daily (scaled) 
institutional trading activity 
LogSize Natural log of equity market capitalization (Compustat: item 25*item 199) as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
LogAge Natural log of number of years since firm's first appearance on CRSP database as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Leverage Ratio of total book debt to total book assets (Compustat: (item 9 + item 34)/item 6) as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Dividend Payer Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm pays cash dividends to common shares (Compustat: item 21) as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Option Value of stock options outstanding at year-end (Compustat: OPTOSEY / item 25) as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Stock  Annualized stock return daily volatility during prior 5 years as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
LogAnalysts Natural log of one plus number of analysts making fiscal year-end earnings forecasts as reported in I/B/E/S as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Blockholding Total % ownership of 13F filers  with at least 5% stake each as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Institutional Ownership Total % ownership of 13F filers as reported at end of previous quarter as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
S&P 500 Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm included in the S&P500 as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
High Tech Indicator variable equal to 1 if SIC code between 7370-7379 (Heron and Lie, 2009) as of the fiscal year ending in 2005 
Backdating Likelihood Quintile 
Quintile rank of firm-level predicted probability of backdating from logistic 
regression estimates (Table A.2), with rank 1 corresponding to the lowest 
probabilities of backdating, and 5 corresponding to the highest probabilities  
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Appendix Table A.2 – Determinants of Firm-specific Option Backdating News Likelihood. 
This table reports logistic regression estimates of the determinants of firm-specific option backdating news. The sample 
includes 3,133 unique firms in the ANcerno database between 2006 and 2007, among which 157 are associated with firm-
specific news concerning the option backdating scandal during the same period on Factiva. The dependent variable is 
BackdateDum as defined in Table A.1. All independent variables are measured as of the fiscal year ending in calendar 
year 2005. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The column Marginal Effect reports the predicted change in 
the probability of backdating news given a one standard deviation increase in the corresponding continuous variable or a 
unit increase in the corresponding indicator variable, holding all other variables constant at their means. Superscripts a, b, 
and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table A.1 provides details on variable 
definitions and data sources. 
 
 
 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept -9.89a (0.83) 
LogSize 0.15 (0.11) 0. 55% 
LogAge 0.28b (0.14) 0.58% 
Leverage -0.40 (0.45) -0.18% 
Dividend Payer -0.57b (0.28) -0.61% 
Option 6.40a (1.35) 0.83% 
Stock  2.47a (0.39) 1.44% 
Blockholding -0.52 (0.80) -0.11% 
Institutional Ownership 2.20a (0.61) 1.29% 
LogAnalysts 0.78a (0.19) 1.55% 
S&P 500 0.28 (0.31) 0.18% 
High Tech 0.37 (0.24) 0.18% 
 
N 3,133 Uncond. Prob. 
Pseudo-R2 0.0791 5.01% 
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Figure 3 – Difference in Mean Abnormal Institutional Daily Trading Imbalance between High and Low 
Backdating Risk Stocks (Q5-Q1). 
This figure shows the difference between mean abnormal daily trading imbalances in the highest, Q5, and lowest, Q1, 
quintiles of predicted likelihood of firm-specific backdating news. The sample is restricted to firms with the data required 
to estimate the logistic regression model for the likelihood of backdating news in Table A.2. This sample includes 3,133 
unique firms, 157 of which are identified as potential backdaters. Solid black bars indicate that the mean daily imbalance 
differential is statistically significant at least at the 10% level in a two-sided test. 
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Table 1 – Pre-Scandal Sample Characteristics. 
The table reports summary statistics of institutional daily trading activity and firm characteristics measured during or as of 
the end of 2005. Panel A reports the cross-sectional sample statistics of firm-level time-series daily averages measured 
during calendar year 2005. Panel B reports the cross-sectional sample statistics of firm-level characteristics measured as 
of the last fiscal year end during calendar year 2005. In the last two columns, superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All continuous variables in Panel B are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1%. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data sources.    
 
 Backdating Firms Non-Backdating Firms  
Backdating minus 
Non-Backdating 
 N(T) Mean Median 
Std.  
Dev. N Mean Median
Std.  
Dev.  Means Medians
 
Panel A: Institutional Daily Trading Pre-Scandal 
VolInst 198 0.1551 0.1343 0.1048 6,806 0.0719 0.0317 0.1183 0.0832a 0.1026a 
VolInstBuy 198 0.0805 0.0708 0.0561 6,806 0.0376 0.0146 0.0819 0.0429a 0.0561a 
VolInstSell 198 0.0746 0.0622 0.0538 6,806 0.0343 0.0145 0.0519 0.0403a 0.0477a 
VolInstImbal 198 0.0059 0.0033 0.0333 6,806 0.0033 0.0000 0.0692 0.0026 0.0033 
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Pre-Scandal 
LogSize 157 7.1273 7.0528 1.5725 2,976 5.9557 5.9040 1.9230 1.1716a 1.1488a 
LogAge 157 2.5664 2.5649 0.5580 2,976 2.4379 2.4849 0.9857 0.1284a 0.0800 
Leverage 157 0.1535 0.0534 0.2237 2,976 0.1901 0.1305 0.2547 -0.0366b -0.0770a
Dividend Payer 157 0.1783 0.0000 0.3840 2,976 0.2917 0.0000 0.4546 -0.1133a 0.0000a 
Option 157 0.1441 0.1378 0.0703 2,976 0.1049 0.0929 0.0701 0.0392a 0.0448a 
Stock  157 0.7034 0.6662 0.2554 2,976 0.6290 0.5674 0.3027 0.0744a 0.0988a 
Blockholding 157 0.1984 0.1807 0.1315 2,976 0.1720 0.1453 0.1467 0.0265b 0.0354a 
Inst. Ownership 157 0.7342 0.7816 0.2124 2,976 0.5325 0.5684 0.3045 0.2017a 0.2132a 
LogAnalysts 157 2.4953 2.5649 0.7576 2,976 1.5749 1.7918 1.0391 0.9204a 0.7732a
S&P 500 157 0.2357 0.0000 0.4258 2,976 0.0995 0.0000 0.2993 0.1362a 0.0000a 
High-Tech  157 0.2229 0.0000 0.4175 2,976 0.0887 0.0000 0.2844 0.1342a 0.0000a 
Backdating 
  Likelihood  
  Quintile (1 to 5) 
157 4.4968 5.0000 0.8595 2,976 2.9217 3.0000 1.3940  1.5751
a 2.0000a 
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Table 2 – Abnormal Institutional Daily Trading before the First Release of Firm-specific Backdating News. 
This table reports event-time mean abnormal institutional daily trading activity in the ANcerno database prior to 198 
events corresponding to a first release of firm-specific option backdating news during 2006 and 2007. For each stock, 
abnormal daily trading activity in the [-120, 0] window is the stock’s daily trading activity minus its 2005 Benchmark 
Mean, as defined in Table A.1. The event window is centered on the first release date of firm-specific option backdating 
news, or the first trading day following such date. Panel A reports the mean daily abnormal buy, sell, and imbalance 
volumes around all first news events. Panel B reports the mean daily abnormal imbalances around first news events 
separately for, SECDOJ or Lawsuit, 137 firms subject to SEC/DOJ investigation without subsequent exoneration or 
facing a shareholder class-action or derivative lawsuit and, No SECDOJ or Lawsuit, 29 firms receiving SEC/DOJ 
exoneration notice or facing no shareholder lawsuit, conducting no internal investigation, and not subject to SEC/DOJ 
investigation. Panel C reports the mean daily abnormal imbalances around first news events separately for, Early 
Exposure, 110 firms whose first backdating news event is in or before August 2006 and, Late Exposure, 88 firms whose 
first backdating news event is between September 2006 and December 2007. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data 
sources.  
 
 
Panel A: Mean Daily Activity Around All First News 
[Window] VolInstBuy VolInstSell VolInstImbal 
[-120, -61] -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0024 
[-60, -21] -0.0195a -0.0128a -0.0067 
[-20, -11] -0.0190a -0.0005 -0.0185b 
[-10, -6] -0.0335a -0.0013 -0.0323a 
[-5, -1] -0.0314a 0.0032 -0.0346a 
0 -0.0247b 0.0737a -0.0984a 
 
Panel B: Mean Daily Imbalance,  
Conditional on Investigations and Lawsuits 
[Window] SECDOJ  or Lawsuit 
No SECDOJ  
or Lawsuit 
Diff  
p-value 
[-120, -61] 0.0005 0.0059 0.66 
[-60, -21] -0.0083 -0.0075 0.95 
[-20, -11] -0.0232b -0.0142 0.59 
[-10, -6] -0.0347a -0.0121 0.27 
[-5, -1] -0.0419a 0.0147 0.02 b 
0 -0.1322a -0.0362 0.03 b 
 
Panel C: Mean Daily Imbalance, 
 Conditional on the Timing of the First Firm-Specific Backdating News 
[Window] Early Exposure 
Late 
Exposure 
Diff  
p-value 
[-120, -61] 0.002 -0.0081 c 0.36 
[-60, -21] -0.0126c 0.0006 0.15 
[-20, -11] -0.0297b -0.0045 0.10 c 
[-10, -6] -0.0476a -0.0131 0.04 b 
[-5, -1] -0.0428a -0.0245b 0.24 
0 -0.1403a -0.0460a 0.01 a 
 
 39  
  
Table 3 – Abnormal Profitability of Institutional Trades Executed before the First Release of Firm-Specific 
Backdating News. 
This table reports mean abnormal trading profits and calendar-time trading portfolio alpha using ANcerno trades prior to 
198 events corresponding to a first release of firm-specific option backdating news between 2006 and 2007. Panel A 
reports the average abnormal trade profit as described in Table A.1. For each trade during the relevant window, the 
abnormal profit is calculated assuming the trade is reversed either the day after the first firm-specific news or 60 trading 
days after the news. Trading windows [-x, -1] includes all trades taking place during the period starting x trading days 
before (the day of) the first news event and ending one trading day before the news event. Trading profit estimates are 
reported in percentages (%). Num. Trades per Stock-Day is the average number of trades per stock-day during the trading 
window. The table reports value-weighted profits based on the principal’s dollar value. Panel A reports the value-
weighted mean abnormal trading profits for all first news events. Panel B partitions the sample based on the SEC/DOJ 
investigation outcomes and private litigation/investigations. SECDOJ or Lawsuit includes firms subjected to SEC/DOJ 
investigation without subsequent exoneration or facing a shareholder class-action or derivative lawsuit; No includes firms 
exonerated by the SEC/DOJ or facing no external or internal investigations and no lawsuit.  Panel C partitions the sample 
based on the timing of the first firm-specific news. Early Exposure includes firms with first news events during or before 
August 2006; and Late Exposure includes firms with first news events between September 2006 and December 2007. All 
means reported in Panels A, B, and C are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. All differences between 
subsamples in Panels B and C are significant at the 1% level. Panel D reports mean daily calendar-time buy-sell portfolio 
return, computed as described in Table A.1. #Days is the number of days for which the daily portfolio return are 
calculated.  The t-stats reported in parentheses are calculated using standard errors adjusted using Newey-West procedure 
to control for potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  Table A.1 provides details on variables and data sources. 
 
[Window]  
Num. Trades 
per Stock-Day 
Mean Profit if trade reversed 
1 trading day after exposure 
Mean Profit if trade reversed 60 
trading  days after exposure 
 
Panel A: VW Mean Trade Abnormal Profits, All First News Events 
[-120, -1] 74 -0.27 0.17 
[-60, -1] 87 -0.13 0.79 
[-20, -1] 102 0.72 1.64 
 
Panel B: Mean Abnormal Profits, Conditional on Investigations and/or Lawsuits 
   
SECDOJ  
or Lawsuit No   
SECDOJ  
or Lawsuit No  
SECDOJ  
or Lawsuit No 
[-120, -1] 76 123 -0.31 0.24 0.66 -0.53 
[-60, -1] 86 157 -0.48 0.51 1.83 -0.45 
[-20, -1]   98 134    1.08 -0.24   2.93 -1.51 
 
Panel C: Mean Abnormal Profits, Conditional on the Timing of the First Release of Firm-Specific Backdating News  
   
Early 
Exposure 
Late 
Exposure   
Early 
Exposure 
Late 
 Exposure  
Early 
Exposure 
Late  
Exposure 
[-120, -1] 96 44 -0.48 0.56 -0.07 1.08 
[-60, -1] 112 53 -0.31 0.56 0.16 0.95 
[-20, -1]   133 59    0.55 1.27   1.28 2.87 
 
Panel D: Daily Calendar-Time Principal-Weighted Trading Portfolio Return, Window: [-20,-1] 
 
Position reversed  
the day after the news event 
Position reversed  
60 trading days after the event 
 #Days 
Mean  
Daily Return #Days 
Mean  
Daily Return 
Full Sample (All First News Event) 319 0.104 (4.31) 402 0.111 (6.69) 
Subsample: SECDOJ or Lawsuit 292 0.147 (4.37) 384 0.136 (4.26) 
Subsample: Late Exposure    193 0.161 (5.78)    276 0.178 (6.37) 
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Table 4 – Abnormal Institutional Daily Trading Imbalance before the First Release of Firm-Specific Backdating 
News, by Investor Location. 
This table reports mean institutional daily trading imbalances in the ANcerno database prior to 198 events corresponding 
to the first release of firm-specific option backdating news between 2006 and 2007, when trades are segmented based on 
the location of the portfolio manager relative to the firm’s headquarters. Each investor-stock pair is partitioned into one of 
two groups: Local identifies trades in the ANcerno set whose portfolio managers are located in the same state as the firm’s 
headquarter; Non-Local identifies trades in the ANcerno set whose portfolio managers are located outside the firm’s 
headquarter state. For each institution-type: Panel A reports the mean abnormal daily imbalance of institutional trades 
within event windows centered on first news dates, as defined in Table 2; Panel B reports the mean abnormal daily 
imbalance for the subsample of 137 firms subjected to SEC/DOJ investigation without subsequent exoneration or facing a 
shareholder class-action or derivative lawsuit.  Panel C reports the mean abnormal daily imbalance for the subsample of 
88 firms with first news events between September 2006 and December 2007. Table 2 provides further details on these 
sample restrictions. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data sources. 
 
     Investor Location Relative to Firm’s HQ 
[Window] Local Non-Local 
 
Panel A: Mean Daily Imbalance, All Firms 
[-120, -61] -0.0034 -0.0093 
[-60, -21]  -0.0074a -0.0031 
[-20, -1] -0.0062  -0.0192a 
0 -0.0473  -0.0638a 
 
Panel B: SECDOJ or Lawsuit 
[-120, -61] -0.0020 -0.0023 
[-60, -21] -0.0043 -0.0021 
[-20, -1]  -0.0067b  -0.0184b 
0 -0.0608  -0.0647a 
 
Panel C: Late Exposure 
[-120, -61] -0.0110b -0.0124 
[-60, -21] -0.0098b -0.0007 
[-20, -1] -0.0084c  -0.0156c 
0   0.0067  -0.0507a 
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Table 5 – Abnormal Profitability of Institutional Trades Executed before the First Release of Firm-Specific 
Backdating News, by Investor Location. 
This table reports mean abnormal profits of institutional trades in the ANcerno set prior to 198 events corresponding to a 
first release of firm-specific option backdating news between 2006 and 2007, when trades are segmented based on the 
location of the portfolio manager relative to the firm’s headquarters. Local identifies trades in the ANcerno set whose 
portfolio managers are located in the same state as the firm’s headquarter; Non-Local identifies trades in the ANcerno set 
whose portfolio managers are located outside the firm’s headquarter state. For each institution-type, the table reports 
value-weighted mean profits based on the principal’s dollar value. A trade’s abnormal profit is estimated as described in 
Table A.1, assuming the trade is reversed on the trading day after the first news event (Panel A) or 60 trading days after 
the first news event (Panel B). Each panel reports mean profits in percentages (%) for: all first news events, All Firms; 
only first news events of firms subject to government investigations without subsequent exoneration or facing a 
shareholder lawsuit, SECDOJ or Lawsuit; or only first news events occurring after August 2006, Late Exposure. Table 2 
provides further details on these sample restrictions. Mean profits with a superscript h are not statistically significant. 
Mean trade profits with superscript f and g are significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. All means without 
superscripts are significant at the 1% level. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data sources. 
 
  Investor Location Relative to Firm’s HQ 
[Window]   Local Non-Local 
 
Panel A: VW Mean Trade Abnormal Profits - Position Reversed the Day after the News Event 
Panel A1: All Firms 
[-120, -1] 0.55 -0.62 
[-60, -1] 0.37 -0.32 
[-20, -1] 0.90  0.02h 
Panel A2: SECDOJ or Lawsuit 
[-120, -1] 0.94 -0.52 
[-60, -1] 0.77 -0.64 
[-20, -1] 1.69  0.27 
Panel A3: Late Exposure 
[-120, -1] 0.72 -0.26 
[-60, -1] 0.97 -0.29 
[-20, -1]   1.60  0.24 
 
Panel B: VW Mean Trade Abnormal Profits - Position Reversed 60 Trading Days after the News Event 
Panel B1: All Firms 
[-120, -1] 0.73 -0.07 
[-60, -1] 0.91  0.15 
[-20, -1] 1.88  0.36 
Panel B2: SECDOJ or Lawsuit 
[-120, -1] 1.55 -0.05 
[-60, -1] 2.08 -0.13 
[-20, -1] 3.27  0.61 
Panel B3: Late Exposure 
[-120, -1]    1.59  0.01 
[-60, -1] 1.36 -0.02 
[-20, -1]    2.96  0.15 
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Table 6 – Abnormal Institutional Daily Trading Imbalance after The Wall Street Journal’s article “The Perfect 
Payday” on March 18, 2006, t=0. 
This table reports mean abnormal daily imbalance of trades in the ANcerno set following the The Wall Street Journal 
article “The Perfect Payday” on March 18, 2006, conditional on predicted probability of firm-specific backdating news. 
The sample includes firms in the top quintile of predicted likelihood of firm-specific backdating news (Q5) among 3,133 
unique firms with available stock price data on CRSP as well as data required to estimate the probability of firm-specific 
backdating news. The predicted likelihood of firm-specific backdating news is based on the logistic model estimates 
presented in Table A.2. Panel A reports the mean imbalance for all Q5 stocks.  These stocks are further segmented based 
on whether the firm is ever exposed to have engaged in option backdating, Panel B, Q5 Already/Later, or not, Panel C, Q5 
Never. Each panel reports Mean Daily Imbalance, the mean abnormal institutional daily trading imbalance within event 
windows following the WSJ article date, t=0.  For each trading window, we report the mean abnormal institutional daily 
trading imbalance separately based on the investor location relative to the firm headquarters, Local and Non-Local, as 
described in Tables 4 and 5. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data sources. 
 
Mean Daily Imbalance 
[Window] All Trades 
Local 
Trades 
Non-Local 
Trades 
Diff  
p-value 
 
Panel A: Q5, All High Backdating Risk Stocks 
[1, 60] -0.0036 -0.0031c -0.0021 0.17 
[61, 120] -0.0081a -0.0018b 0.0044 0.06 
[121, 250] -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0029 0.34 
[251, 350] -0.0046 -0.0042 -0.0043 0.55 
 
Panel B: Q5 Already/Later, High Risk Stocks Already/Later Exposed 
[1, 60] -0.0088c -0.0080b -0.0182c 0.03 
[61, 120] -0.0086b -0.0028 -0.0129b 0.08 
[121, 250] -0.0152 b -0.0036 -0.0053 0.34 
[251, 350] -0.0112 b -0.0021c -0.0091b 0.27 
 
Panel C: Q5 Never, High Risk Stocks Never Exposed 
[1, 60] -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0065b 0.03 
[61, 120] -0.0080 a -0.0015 -0.0026b 0.08 
[121, 250] 0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0024 0.53 
[251, 350] -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0032 0.80 
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Table 7 – Abnormal Profitability of Institutional Trades Executed after the WSJ’s “The Perfect Payday” article of 
March 18, 2006, t=0. 
This table reports mean abnormal profits of trades in the ANcerno set that follow the WSJ article publication date (March 
18, 2006). Panel A includes firms in the top quintile (Q5) of predicted likelihood of firm-specific backdating news, as 
described in Table 6. The sample is further segmented based on whether the firm is ever exposed to have engaged in 
option backdating, Panel B, Q5 Already/Later, or not, Panel C, Q5 Never. For each trading window, the table also reports 
mean trade abnormal profits separately based on the investor location relative to the firm headquarters, Local and Non-
Local, as described in Tables 4 and 5. All panels report the value-weighted mean trade abnormal profits based on the 
principal’s dollar value, as defined in Table 3, in percentages (%). Mean profits with a superscript h are not statistically 
significant. Mean trade profits with superscript f and g are significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. All means 
without superscripts are significant at the 1% level. All differences between Local and Non-Local mean profits are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data sources. 
 
  
Value-Weighted Mean Trade Abnormal Profits,  
Position Reversed on Day t After March 18, 2006, in % 
t=370 t=410 
[Window]   All Trades 
Local 
Trades 
Non-Local 
Trades   
All 
Trades 
Local 
Trades 
Non-Local 
Trades 
 
 Panel A: Q5, All High Backdating Risk Stocks 
[1, 60] 0.52 0.86 0.30 1.28 1.79 0.40 
[61, 120] 0.14 0.37 0.09 0.22 0.57 0.11 
[121, 250] 0.21 0.55 0.04 0.16 0.61 0.06 
[251, 350] 0.19 0.49 0.03 0.14 0.58 0.05 
[1, 350] 0.20 0.31 0.06 0.29 0.40 0.11 
 
Panel B: Q5 Already/Later, High Risk Stocks Already/Later Exposed 
[1, 60] 1.93 3.18 1.56 2.75 3.59 1.84 
[61, 120] 0.48 1.21 0.13 0.72 1.54 0.32 
[121, 250] 0.43 1.07 0.08 0.27 1.22 0.09 
[251, 350] 0.28 0.64 0.04 0.32 0.71 0.06 
[1, 350] 0.30 0.86 0.07 0.46 0.92 0.27 
 
Panel C: Q5 Never, High Risk Stocks Never Exposed 
[1, 60] 0.35 0.62 0.14 0.44 0.7 0.21 
[61, 120] -0.06 0.15 -0.11 -0.03 0.18 -0.11 
[121, 250] 0.10 0.33 0.02 0.08 0.44 0.05 
[251, 350] 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.32 0.01 
[1, 350]   0.11 0.24 0.02   0.12 0.30 0.03 
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Table 8 – Abnormal Institutional Daily Trading Imbalance after the First Release of Firm-Specific Backdating 
News. 
This table reports mean institutional daily trading in the ANcerno set following 198 events corresponding to the first 
release of firm-specific option backdating news between 2006 and 2007. For each stock, abnormal daily trading activity is 
the stock’s daily trading (buy, sell, or buy-minus sell) volume measure minus its 2005 Benchmark Mean, as defined in 
Table A.1. Panel A reports the mean daily abnormal buy, sell, and imbalance volumes following all first news events. 
Panel B reports the mean abnormal daily imbalances separately for the subsample of firms subject to SEC/DOJ 
investigation without subsequent exoneration or facing a shareholder lawsuit, SECDOJ or Lawsuit, and the subsample of 
firms receiving SEC/DOJ exoneration or facing no shareholder lawsuit and no internal or external investigation, No. Panel 
C reports the mean abnormal daily imbalances separately for the subsample of firms whose first backdating news event is 
in or before August 2006, Early Exposure, and the subsample of firms whose first backdating news event is between 
September 2006 and December 2007, Late Exposure. Panel D reports the mean daily abnormal daily imbalances 
separately for Local and Non-Local investors, as defined in Tables 4 and 5. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and data 
sources. 
 
Panel A: Mean Abnormal Trading Activity after All First News 
[Window] VolInstBuy VolInstSell VolInstImbal 
[1, 5] -0.0050 0.0565c -0.0615b 
[6, 10] -0.0231a -0.0064 -0.0167c 
[11, 20] -0.0203a -0.0120c -0.0084 
 
Panel B: Mean Abnormal Daily Imbalance, Conditional on Investigations and Lawsuits 
SECDOJ or Lawsuit No Diff p-value 
[1, 5] -0.0520a -0.0037  0.05 b 
[6, 10] -0.0330b 0.0086  0.02 b 
[11, 20] -0.0184b 0.0011 0.17 
 
Panel C: Mean Abnormal Daily Imbalance, Conditional on the Timing of the First Firm-Specific Backdating News 
Early Exposure Late Exposure Diff p-value 
[1, 5] -0.0539a -0.0710 c 0.79 
[6, 10] -0.0262c -0.0048 0.22 
[11, 20] -0.0114 -0.0046 0.58 
 
Panel D: Mean Abnormal Daily Imbalance, Conditional on Investor Location 
Local Non-Local Diff p-value 
[1,5] -0.0005  -0.0643a   0.03 b 
[6,10]  0.0006  -0.0512b   0.07 c 
[11,20]  0.0047 -0.0018 0.20 
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Table 9 – Abnormal Profitability of Institutional Trades Executed after the First Release of Firm-Specific 
Backdating News.  
This table reports mean abnormal profits of trades in the ANcerno set executed after 198 first releases of firm-specific 
option backdating news during 2006 and 2007. For each trade executed during the relevant window, abnormal trade profit 
is computed as described in Table A.1, assuming the trade is reversed t (i.e., 2 or 60) trading days after the end of the 
trading  window. We include all trades executed in the [0, 20] event window: the period starting on the event day and 
ending 20 trading days after the event date. Trading profit estimates are reported in percentages (%). Num. Trades per 
Stock-Day is the average number of trades per stock-day during the relevant window. Reported means are value-weighted 
based on the principal’s dollar value. Panel A reports the value-weighted mean trade abnormal profits for all first news 
events. Panel B reports the value-weighted mean trade abnormal profits when the sample is partitioned based on 
SEC/DOJ investigations and shareholder lawsuits. Panel C reports the value-weighted mean trade abnormal profits when 
the sample is partitioned based on the timing of the first firm-specific news. Panel D reports the value-weighted mean 
trade abnormal profits when the sample is partitioned based on the investor location relative to the firm headquarters. 
Mean profits with a superscript g indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. All other reported means are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Mean differences between SECDOJ or Lawsuit and No (Panel B) and 
between Local and Non-Local traders (Panel D) are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Mean differences between 
Early and Late Exposure (Panel C) are not statistically significant. Table A.1 provides details on variable definitions and 
data sources. 
 
   Position Reversed t days after the trading window 
Num. Trades t=2 t=60 [Window]   per Stock-Day 
 
Panel A: VW Mean Trade Abnormal Profits, All First News  
[0, 20] 70 -0.03g -0.60 
 
Panel B: Mean Abnormal Profits, Conditional on Investigations and Lawsuits 
   
SECDOJ 
or Lawsuit No  
SECDOJ 
or Lawsuit No  
SECDOJ 
or Lawsuit No 
[0, 20]  81 58 0.36 -2.04 -0.58 -0.66 
 
Panel C: Mean Abnormal Profits, Conditional on the Timing of the First Firm-Specific Backdating News 
   
Early 
Exposure 
Late 
Exposure   
Early 
Exposure 
Late 
Exposure   
Early 
Exposure 
Late 
Exposure 
[0, 20]  98 44 0.07 -0.34 -0.58 -0.66 
 
Panel D: Mean Abnormal Profits, Conditional on Investor Location 
  Local Non-Local    Local Non-Local    Local Non-Local 
[0, 20]  18 53  0.29 -0.14  0.18 -0.73 
 
